报告主题：Mandatory Repurchase Disclosure and the Use of Share Repurchases as an Earnings Management Device （强制回购披露与作为盈余管理手段的股份回购的运用）

报告人：Hong Xie, Gatton College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506

时间：2018年6月7日（星期四），14：00-16：00

举行地点：综合楼802会议室 

内容提要: 

In December 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amended Rule 10b-18, which significantly enhanced the disclosure of repurchase transactions. We hypothesize and find that the enhanced disclosure of repurchase activities curtails firms’ use of repurchases as an earnings management device to meet or beat analyst forecast benchmarks (Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2006) in the high disclosure period post the amendment relative to the low disclosure period before the amendment. In addition, the enhanced disclosure of repurchase activities alleviates the real consequences of repurchases(decreases in employment, capital expenditures, and R&D expenditures) in the high disclosure period relative to the low disclosure period. Moreover, the enhanced disclosure enables the market to discount earnings surprises induced by repurchases (Hribar et al., 2006) more severely in the high disclosure period relative to the low disclosure period. Overall, our findings are consistent with the SEC’s 2003 amendment having mitigated firms’ repurchase-based earnings management behavior, alleviated the negative real consequences of repurchases, and helped market participants detect and discount the portion of earnings surprises induced by share repurchase-based earnings management.